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The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity Underwritings
Summary
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) executed through accelerated underwritings have increased
global market share recently, raising over $850 billion since 1998, and now account for over
half (two-thirds) of the value of U.S. (European) SEOs. We examine 31,242 global SEOs,
executed during 1991-2004, which raise over $2.9 trillion for firms and selling shareholders.
Compared to fully marketed deals, accelerated offerings occur more rapidly, raise more money,
and require fewer underwriters. Importantly, accelerated deals reduce total issuance cost by
about 250 basis points. Accelerated deals sell equal fractions of primary and secondary shares,
whereas in traditional SEOs primary shares dominate. Announcement period returns are
comparable for traditional and accelerated offerings, while secondary and mixed offerings
trigger more negative market responses than do primary offerings. We conclude that this rapid,
worldwide shift towards accelerated underwriting creates a spot market for SEOs, and
represents the long-predicted shift towards an auction model for seasoned equity sales.
Keywords: Equity Offerings, Underwriting, Investment Banking
JEL Classification: G15, G24

We wish to thank Luca Farinola, May Li, Lindsey Scott, Jeff Christensen, Scott Kleman, Kunal
Tayal, Ramabhadran Thirumalai, and, especially, Valentina Milella for research assistance
with this project. We also benefited from comments offered by Anup Aggarwal, Oya Altinkiliç,
Paul Bennett, Susan Christofferson, Giacomo Ciampolini (Goldman Sachs, Italy), Shane
Corwin, Louis Ederington, Chitru Fernando, Jie Gan, Kathleen Weiss Hanley, Rob Hansen,
Dirk Jenter, Charles Jones, Inmoo Lee, Marc Lipson, Carlo Michelini (Morgan Stanley, Italy),
Brian McCall, Massimo Pappone (Lazard, Italy), Jay Ritter, Fredrik Schlengiman, Ann
Sherman, John Scruggs, George Sofianos, Stephen Wei, Pradeep Yadav, and participants in the
2005 European Financial Management Association meeting (Siena), the 2005 World
Federation of Exchanges Emerging Market Conference (Beijing), the 2006 Privatization of
Infrastructure Conference in Abu Dhabi (UAE), the 2006 Australian Banking and Finance
Conference (Sydney), the 2007 American Finance Association meeting, and seminar
participants at Bocconi University, Indiana University, McGill University, the University of
New Orleans, the New York Stock Exchange, the University of Oklahoma, and the University of
Pittsburgh.

Address for correspondence:
William L. Megginson
Price College of Business
The University of Oklahoma
307 West Brooks, 205A Adams Hall
Norman, OK 73019-4005
USA
Phone: 405 3252058
Fax: 4053257688
E-mail: wmegginson@ou.edu

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper70

2

Megginson et al.: The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity Underwritings

THE RISE OF ACCELERATED SEASONED EQUITY UNDERWRITINGS1
Introduction
The global investment banking industry has been transformed over the past fifteen years,
reflecting the increased role of capital markets in funding and monitoring corporations around the world.
This transformation is partly one of scale, as the total value of securities issued by businesses has
(according to the Investment Dealers’ Digest’s annual league table summaries) risen from $580 billion
globally in 1990 to over $7.6 trillion in 2006, and partly one of scope, reflected in the myriad activities
conducted by Citigroup, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, CSFB, and other global banking groups.
Yet even as capital markets have grown in size and sophistication, they have also converged in practices
to a remarkable extent. Ljunqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) show that U.S.-style bookbuilding has
become the dominant method of executing initial public offerings in all major world markets, and Eckbo,
Masulis, and Norli (2006) describe how this also seems to be occurring for other types of debt and equity
sales. Even failed market experiments have prompted global convergence in banking practices, since
Jagannathan and Sherman (2005) and Kutsuna and Smith (2004) show that IPO auctions have failed and
been supplanted by bookbuilding in every major world market where firms may choose between auctions
and other offering techniques.
In sharp contrast to the eclipse of auctions in IPO markets, we document movement in the
opposite direction in the much larger global market for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).2 Seasoned
common stock sales executed through accelerated underwritings, which are effectively auctions, have
dramatically increased global market share recently, and now account for over half the value of U.S.
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and over two-thirds of European SEOs.

1

We wish to thank Luca Farinola, May Li, Lindsey Scott, Jeff Christensen, Scott Kleman, Kunal Tayal,
Ramabhadran Thirumalai, and, especially, Valentina Milella for research assistance with this project. We also
benefited from comments offered by Anup Aggarwal, Oya Altinkiliç, Paul Bennett, Susan Christofferson, Giacomo
Ciampolini (Goldman Sachs, Italy), Shane Corwin, Louis Ederington, Chitru Fernando, Jie Gan, Kathleen Weiss
Hanley, Rob Hansen, Dirk Jenter, Charles Jones, Inmoo Lee, Marc Lipson, Carlo Michelini (Morgan Stanley, Italy),
Brian McCall, Massimo Pappone (Lazard, Italy), Jay Ritter, Fredrik Schlengiman, Ann Sherman, John Scruggs,
George Sofianos, Stephen Wei, Pradeep Yadav, and participants in the 2005 European Financial Management
Association meeting (Siena), the 2005 World Federation of Exchanges Emerging Market Conference (Beijing), the
2006 Privatization of Infrastructure Conference in Abu Dhabi (UAE), the 2006 Australian Banking and Finance
Conference (Sydney), the 2007 American Finance Association meeting, and seminar participants at Bocconi
University, Indiana University, McGill University, the University of New Orleans, the New York Stock Exchange,
the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Pittsburgh.
2

Although relatively few companies raise capital through a seasoned equity offering in any given year, SEOs
usually raise much more total annual financing than do IPOs, largely because seasoned offerings are much larger.
For example, in 2004-2005 global SEO dollar volume was nearly double IPO volume. Fama and French (2005)
show that only about 40 percent of large (30 percent of small) U.S. public companies execute an SEO as frequently
as once per decade, and only about 11 percent of large (8 percent of small) public companies launch an SEO in any
given year.
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Two of the three forms of accelerated underwriting—block trades (BTs) and bought deals
(BDs)—involve the very rapid sale of large blocks of shares, at an auction-determined market price,
directly to an investment bank by the issuing firm or selling shareholder, with little need or capacity for
information production with respect to pricing or demand. The winning bank is then responsible for
reselling the shares to institutional investors. The third and most popular types of accelerated
underwritings, accelerated bookbuilt offerings (ABO), are executed much more rapidly than conventional
bookbuilds, but are similar to traditional underwritings in that banks are responsible for the quality of the
order book, price stabilization, and transparency of the allocation. Yet, even ABOs have auction-like
features, such as aggressive bidding by different banks in terms of the backstop clause, the minimum
price guaranteed independently of the outcome of the bookbuilding process.
Accelerated transactions differ qualitatively from established SEO underwriting techniques,
which have traditionally been marketed in much the same way as initial public offerings. Seasoned
common stock issues must generally follow similar regulatory processes, though streamlined filing and
disclosure rules are allowed in many countries. Besides its larger average size, a seasoned offering differs
from an IPO in having an observable market value when the offering is priced—which obviously makes
pricing much easier. While details differ between countries and across time, the basic features of
traditional SEO underwriting practices have remained constant. A firm wishing to raise capital by selling
newly issued shares—or a shareholder wishing to sell existing shares—negotiates underwriting terms
directly with one or more investment banks, which then forms a syndicate of banks to actually distribute
shares to investors. Top managers of companies executing primary, capital-raising offers accompany
underwriters on road shows, during which managers tell the company story to potential investors. The
underwriters assess institutional investor demand and determine an offer price by building an order book.
Thus, in traditional underwritten offerings, the investment banks managing the offer assess investor
demand and use the information received to generate an offer price, expressed as a discount to the closing
price of the issuing firms’ shares the day before the offering goes effective.
In accelerated underwritings, banks do not generate this information before firmly bidding for the
shares, and their principal economic function is to resell the stock. In both block trades and bought deals,
the underwriting bank purchases shares directly from the issuing firm or selling shareholder, and is then
unconditionally responsible for re-selling the shares (the bank has no recourse to the original seller). In an
ABO, the lead-manager bank is able to assess market demand before committing to an underwritten share
price—though there is no time to conduct true due diligence before bidding for the underwriting
mandate—and shares must be placed very rapidly [Mannix (2003)]. ABO issuers select the global
coordinator based on the backstop clause, underwriting spread, and other profit-sharing agreements. The
winning bank then elicits bids from a list of top tier institutional investors in order to ensure a more
accurate price for the issue and often engages in price stabilization, at least for the larger ABOs. All three
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types of accelerated deals thus place a great premium on investment banks’ capital base and risk
tolerance.
We document and seek to explain the cause of the dramatic rise of accelerated SEOs around the
world since 1991.3 We also ask whether this evolution has been driven by value-maximizing motives for
all parties (investors, firms and bankers), or whether it has been driven by predatory corporate behavior.
One possibility is that accelerated deals were pushed on reluctant firms, and their shareholders, by
increasingly powerful investment banks in order to increase banking revenues. This is similar to
Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) “analyst lust hypothesis,” posited to explain the sharp rise in IPO
underpricing during the late 1990s. We test whether banks have benefited at the expense of firms and
investors by examining the costs and pricing of ATs versus traditional SEO deals, and we test whether
these underwritings have transferred wealth from investors to corporate managers by examining the
market impact of AT announcements.
Our task of describing ATs is especially challenging because the institutional and legal details of
accelerated underwritings are so unfamiliar to commentators that even the simplest terminology is hard to
nail down. No official descriptions of the three AT forms are provided on security regulators’ websites,
and the practitioner literature often uses the definitions of various accelerated deals interchangeably. The
definition we use is that accelerated underwritings are (1) seller-initiated, underwritten seasoned equity
offers; (2) that are completed very rapidly; (3) which do not involve a road show, the pre-issue
publication of a detailed prospectus, or anything other than minimal registration with regulatory
authorities and exchanges; and (4) are marketed primarily or exclusively to institutional investors. The
seller typically announces its intent to sell a block of shares and solicits bids from investment banks. The
winning bidder then either buys the block of shares on its own account, and takes responsibility for
placing the shares (in a BT or BD), or rapidly assembles a small underwriting syndicate and places the
deal within 48 hours (in an ABO). Ours is the first full-length study of accelerated underwritings, and the
first to examine the global (rather than European) rise of accelerated deals. Besides documenting the
growth of accelerated underwritings, we hope to codify this technique’s terminology and begin
structuring how this important new security-issuance process can be analyzed by economic, legal and
financial scholars.
We find that ATs are faster, cheaper, raise more capital, and have comparable market impacts to
traditional SEO underwritings, so there is little evidence that sellers have benefited at investor expense.
While this innovation has transferred market power from banks to issuing firms and selling shareholders,
3

We became aware of the importance of accelerated underwritings while serving as members of the Italian
government's Privatization Advisory Committee (the Comitato) from 2002 to 2005. The Italian Ministry of
Economy and Finance launched two accelerated deals during this period that together raised about $4 billion. To our
knowledge, the only published article describing accelerated underwritings is Pappone and Ciampolini (2005), in the
Privatization Barometer Newsletter (http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/newsletter.php?id=3).
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we conclude that the larger banks have benefited since ATs have allowed them to gain market share due
to their relatively larger capital bases and greater risk tolerance. The rise of ATs has unequivocably
promoted the institutionalization of capital market trading and investment holdings, though this is not
necessarily economically sub-optimal. We show that accelerated deals have become popular with issuers
for several reasons, most notably because they are faster and cheaper than marketed deals, expose the
issuer to less price risk during the short underwriting period, and have comparable announcement-period
market impact. On the other hand, accelerated underwritings do not harm investors. We also show why
large investment bankers have embraced accelerated underwritings. Since these deals require banks to
have large capital bases and risk tolerances, they have helped the largest banks consolidate their grip on
global equity underwriting.
We also contribute several important findings to the academic investment banking literature. Ours
is the first truly global event study analysis of the market impact of SEO announcements, as well as one
of the first to show that pure secondary and mixed primary and secondary SEOs yield significantly more
negative announcement period abnormal returns than do capital-raising, primary offers. We also present a
unique analysis of the size of SEO investment banking syndicates—illustrating that accelerated deals
yield much smaller, more capital intense, and presumably riskier underwriting syndicates, but these
generate comparable revenues over much shorter transactions periods and allow banks to effectively
“buy” market share and league table rankings. Finally, we document that very rapid, auction-like
underwriting is becoming the norm for seasoned equity offerings, in sharp contrast to IPOs. This should
help resolve the academic finance debate on the relative merits of issuing securities by auction versus by
intermediated sales. Sensibly, it appears that auctions have decided advantages of cost and speed for
issuing securities with low information asymmetries (seasoned equity, bonds), but that intermediaries will
always be required to certify IPOs, as Wilhelm (2005) and others argue.
This manuscript is organized as follows. Section I describes the evolution of block trades, bought
deals, and accelerated book-built offering techniques in North America and Europe since 1982, while
section II details our data and sample selection methodology. Section IV contrasts accelerated deals with
traditional fully-marketed offerings, while section V econometrically examines whether accelerated deals
are less costly than traditional seasoned equity underwritings. Section VI concludes. Extensive details
about offer characteristics, industry, and selling methods are presented in the Appendix.

I. The evolution of accelerated underwritings
Accelerated underwriting practices developed independently in three separate national markets
during the 1980s and early 1990s, and only began to evolve into a truly standardized global offering
method during the late 1990s. In the United States, existing shareholders have long been able to dispose
of some or all of their holdings in a firm using a registered, underwritten offering. Confusingly, these
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secondary offerings—which are not the focus of our study—are also called block trades if they are sold in
packages of 10,000 or more shares on one of the major U.S. stock exchanges. These are never primary
offerings, but are instead share sales executed principally in upstairs markets by block trade specialists,
who often break the offers into many smaller portions for further sale. These “upstairs market” block
trades—which are modeled theoretically by Seppi (1990) and studied empirically by Dann, Mayers and
Rabb (1977), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990), Keim and Madhavan (1996), and
Madhavan and Cheng (1997)—are far smaller and more transaction-related than the trades we examine.4
The U.S. block trades we study, and the only offerings identified as such by the Securities Data
Corporation New Issues database which we employ, are underwritten offerings by the firms themselves
(primary offers) or by large shareholders (secondary offers). All of the U.S. primary share sales and all
secondary sales executed by existing shareholders with a control relationship to the firm (officers,
directors, and controlling corporate owners) must be registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission [Keegan (2000), O’Connor (2006)]. Capital-raising primary block trades are similar to the
offerings examined in most U.S. seasoned equity offering studies—from Bhagat and Hess (1985) and
Asquith and Mullins (1986) to Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) and Heron and Lie (2004)—while the
secondary block trades are most similar to the registered secondary distributions studied by Mikkelson
and Partch (1986). The block trades in our sample occur only after the adoption of shelf registration (Rule
415) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in 1982. This regulatory change allowed
companies to shelf register significant amounts of new equity, and then to sell blocks of shares as market
conditions allowed any time over the next two years. The first major block trade involving shelfregistered shares, described in Masters (1982), was Houston Industries’ $85 million primary share
offering, underwritten by Goldman Sachs in April 1982.5 As we show in section 3, over 80 percent of
U.S. accelerated underwritings involve shelf-registered shares.
4

The average size of the block trades examined in these studies ranges from $340,000 in Keim and Madhavan to
$1.8 million in Madhavan and Cheng. The block transactions studied in Mikkelson and Regassa (1991) are also
different from both the block trades cited above and the trades we examine in that they examine premiums paid in
37 negotiated third-party purchases and 117 negotiated share-repurchases (greenmail) executed between 1978 and
1987. Several authors also examine block trades in upstairs markets outside the United States, including Anderson,
Cooper, and Prevost (2006, Australia), Smith, Turnbull, and White (2006, Canada), Booth, Lin, Martikainen, and
Tse (2002, Finland), Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2006, France), and Gemmill (1996, Britain). As with the
United States, the trades examined in these studies are far smaller than the BTs we study, involve different buyers
and sellers, and are portfolio-rebalancing rather than corporate financing events.
5
Revealingly, the first two U.S. block trades recorded in the SDC database are the $3.9 million Syncor and the
$45.5 million Electronic Data Systems offerings, launched in June and October 1982, respectively. This set a pattern
where early block trades we identify by searching Lexis/Nexis are not recorded as such in SDC, and vice versa. To
begin building our sample, we read articles from Financial Times, Investment Dealers Digest, the Economist, and
numerous Canadian newspapers describing individual deals and the evolution of accelerated underwritings from
1982 to 2004. From these sources we obtained detailed institutional and legal descriptions of about 400 individual
deals. This search verified early inconsistencies between SDC and contemporary news reports. By the early 1990s,
however, most accelerated deals are recorded as such both in SDC and in the news articles presented in Lexis/Nexis,
though as noted these reports often use the terms interchangeably. This observation, coupled with the fact that SDC
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The block trade underwriting procedure that developed during the mid-1980s is still used today,
and works as follows.6 The issuing firm (or selling shareholder) announces the amount of stock it wishes
to sell, and invites banks to bid for these shares, which they do at a discount to the current market price.
The bank offering the lowest discount wins the right to buy the shares, which it then re-sells on the open
market—hopefully at a profit and hopefully within 24 hours (preferably overnight). Market risk is
transferred unconditionally from issuer to bank with the auction, so issuers can sell shares very rapidly
and with little or no price risk, which is a key reason why block trades have proven so popular with
sellers. Initially, banks merely acquiesced in conducting block trades, but the larger and more ambitious
banks soon realized that these trades offered them the chance to capture underwriting market share
through quick, though risky trades.7 The banks also realized that they could retain all of the underwriting
profits in block trades, rather than share these with other syndicate members [Wall Street Journal (1986)].
Additionally, the large banks realized that participating in accelerated underwritings allowed them to
“buy” market share and quickly move up the league table rankings, since these were large deals that were
typically sole-managed (not syndicated), so banks received full credit for the entire deal [Tunick (2003)
and Skorecki (2004)].
The second major accelerated underwriting innovation occurred in 1983, when the Ontario
Securities Commission (OSC) adopted its prompt offering qualification system, which allowed listed
Canadian firms to file a short-form prospectus and sell seasoned equity very rapidly [see Critchley (1986)
and Critchley and Gittins (1990)]. This spurred development of the bought deal, which has essentially the
same features as the U.S. block trade, but is open only to Canadian issuers, banks and investors. Issuers
announce their desire to sell a block of either existing or newly issued shares, and banks either negotiate
directly with the issuer (if the bank and issuer have an existing relationship both wish to preserve) or bid
for the shares on offer. The winning bank then files the required OSC short-form prospectus and takes
title to the shares, with the entire sale typically being completed overnight. The subsequent resale of
shares by the underwriter to final investors takes, on average, another 20 days. This is called a bought
deal because of the lack of a “market out” clause in the underwriting agreement, meaning that the bank

only begins comprehensive coverage of non-U.S. issues in 1991 helped us decide to begin our study then rather than
in 1982.
6
Descriptions of U.S. block trade procedures, and their historical evolution, are presented in Taylor (1982), Pratt
(1992, 1994), Wirth (1997), Hahn (2000), Tunick (2003), Santini (2004), and Smith (2005).
7
Accelerated underwritings are inherently risky for investment banks, since this involves bidding for large blocks,
priced at very small discounts to trading values, with no time to conduct due diligence, in hopes of quickly reselling
these shares to institutional investors at a profit. The banks must purchase these shares directly from issuers, who
may be better informed about the firm’s prospects than are the banks. Examples of accelerated deals that resulted in
underwriter losses are provided in Hahn (2002), Barber and Skorecki (2003), and Chung (2006). Perhaps the worst
such loss is one we observed first-hand: the Italian government’s $2.5 billion ABO of a 6.6 percent stake in ENEL
in November 2003, which Morgan Stanley purchased at market price (no discount) after winning a bidding contest
with six other banks. ENEL shares fell sharply upon announcement of the ABO, leaving Morgan Stanley with a
reported loss of almost $7 million [Tunick (2003)].
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assumes unconditional price risk once it buys the issuer’s shares. The bought deal quickly came to
dominate Canadian SEOs, and has remained essentially unchanged ever since, despite a stiff challenge
mounted against the process by banks during 1992 [Simon (1992)].
Accelerated underwritings spread to Europe during the late 1980s, and slowly around the world
thereafter.8 As described in Barber (1986) and Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000), the first major British deal
occurred after the London Stock Exchange changed its rules to allow firms greater latitude to execute
placings—sales of new shares to public investors—rather than rights issues, as was effectively required
previously.9 In August 1986, Guinness PLC sold its entire 18.8 million share holding in British Petroleum
for £108.3 million in a block trade priced at a mere three percent discount to BP’s market price. The
success of this deal and other early block trades caused accelerated underwritings to spread throughout
Europe, slowly at first, then very rapidly during the late 1990s. In popular usage, the terms bought deal
and block trade have always been used interchangeably, though SDC seems to adhere to the strict
definition of BD as an offering that uses a short-form prospectus and selling techniques comparable to the
option offered by the Ontario Securities Commission.10 For this reason, over 90 percent of all bought
deals are Canadian issues.
The third major accelerated underwriting innovation occurred in February 1991, when Canada’s
Reichmann family divested their 9.5 percent stake in Britain’s Allied-Lyons PLC in a $900 million
secondary offering that was classified as a bought deal at the time [Critchley and Gittins (1991)]. Years
later, this offering became known as the first accelerated bookbuilt offering (ABO), though the first usage
of that term in any news article covered by Lexis/Nexis occurred only in July 1997 (Warn (1997)). As
noted, ABOs differ from BTs and BDs in that banks do not immediately purchase stock from the issuer at
a fixed price, but instead submit bids for the right to underwrite sale of the block of shares over a short
period—usually 48 hours or less. Banks submit competing bids that differ in terms of the backstop price
guaranteed, underwriting spread, and placement capabilities. The winning bank then is responsible for
very rapidly building an order book and setting a final offer price. In essence, the issuer continues to share
price risk with the underwriting bank throughout the short underwriting period, but in return is able to
execute larger share placements than with BTs or BDs, because the underwriters do not assume as much
unconditional price risk.

8

Plueneke and Templeman (1986) and Shearlock (1994) describe an intriguing earlier (1986), truly international
accelerated underwriting, the disastrous $2.1 billion bought deal of two-thirds of the Libyan government’s holdings
in Italy’s Fiat. Deutsche Bank took on this mandate as a way of breaking into investment banking’s top tier, but the
deal was executed so poorly that syndicate members suffered almost $100 million in losses.
9
The evolution of accelerated underwriting techniques in Europe is described in Barber (1986), Stevenson (1991),
Sharpe (1995a,b), Wright (2001), the Banker (2004), and Stafford (2005).
10
In fact, writers sometimes use the phrases “bought deal” and “block trade” to refer to the same transaction in a
single article! See Santini (2002) and Loades-Carter (2003) for examples.
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Although there were numerous accelerated underwritings in North America, Europe and
elsewhere during the early and late 1990s, traditional fully marketed offerings dominated this period. This
was partly due to the fact that, outside of North America, share issue privatizations (SIPs) were the largest
and most important types of share issues. These naturally tend to be marketed deals because a key
purpose of governments launching SIPs is to sell shares as widely as possible to the voting public—as
discussed in Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999).11 In fact, until the global stock market “break” in
March 2000, it appeared that accelerated underwritings would remain fairly minor niche transactions. It
has only been since March 2000 that accelerated deals, especially ABOs, have surged to preeminence, as
Figure 1 shows.
**** Insert Figure 1 ****

II. Data and sample selection
As our base sample, we select all seasoned equity offerings listed on the SDC New Issues
Database, launched between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2004, that meet the following criteria: (1)
offerings of shares of common stock of publicly listed companies; (2) underwritten offerings that are
made in exchange for cash; and (3) issues that are not payments for takeovers. Although SDC covers U.S.
seasoned offerings from 1970 on, we begin our study in 1991 because this is when SDC reliably begins
covering European and Asian countries. The first selection criterion excludes IPOs, while the
underwriting requirement excludes best efforts (BEST EFFORTS) and issues without offering type listed
(UNKNOWN). The cash payment criterion excludes non-cash (CAPITALIZATION) issues, and the final
criterion screens out TENDER issues. Our purpose is to create a truly global sample of underwritten
seasoned equity offerings, which includes capital-raising pure-primary issues, pure-secondary sales of
shares by existing stockholders, and mixed offerings including both newly-issued and existing shares, as
well as both private-sector share offers and share issue privatization (SIP) sales executed by governments.
In contrast to most published SEO studies, we include offerings from all industries (financial firms and
regulated utilities, as well as industrial companies), and offers on public as well as private markets—
though we examine many classifications separately in subsequent analyses to be comparable to existing
research.
In all our analyses, we study both the full sample of all SEOs from around the world and
country/regional sub-samples. We follow the example of Ljunqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) and
categorize offerings into one of three country/regional groups: the United States, Europe, and the rest of
the world (ROW). Europe is defined in broad geographic terms to include the transition economies of
11

The first major SIPs executed as accelerated underwritings were Britain’s £500 million sale of its remaining
British Petroleum holdings in December 1995 and France’s $619 million divestment of a 4 percent stake in Total in
March 1996. Both sales are labeled bought deals in contemporaneous news reports [Sharpe (1996)], but are
classified as block trades by SDC.
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central Europe (including Russia) and Turkey, though over 90 percent of the 8,546 SEOs in this group
involve shares of firms headquartered in Switzerland, Norway, or one of the 15 members of the European
Union during 1991-2003. The ROW group, by definition, includes offerings from a large and
heterogeneous set of countries, but over 60 percent of these offerings (by number and value) come from
just four countries: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, and Japan. Our final sample consists of 31,242
offerings from almost 100 countries that raise $2.926 trillion (in 2004 dollars). There are 8,270 U.S.
offerings (raising $955.3 billion), 8546 European SEOs (raising $1,089.5 billion), and 14,426 offerings of
shares in companies headquartered in the rest of the world (raising $881.4 billion). The global sample and
regional sub-samples, categorized by offering method and region, are presented in Table I.
**** Insert Table I about here ****
We classify offerings based on the description given in SDC, and initially group these into two
basic categories—accelerated and non-accelerated, or traditional, underwritings. The first category,
accelerated transactions, includes any offer with accelerated bookbuilt (ABO), block trade (BT), or
bought deal (BD) listed as an offering method anywhere in the SDC designation. SDC’s offering
classification method poses an important challenge, since the database frequently gives multiple
designations to a single tranche.12 For instance, many issues are classified as “block trade/negotiated
sale,” “accelerated bookbuilt/firm commitment,” “bought deal/open offer,” or similar combinations. We
classify all tranches with one of these terms included as an accelerated transaction (AT), and called these
mixed ATs.13 We label as pure ATs all tranches that list ABO, BT, or BD exclusively as the offering
technique. There are 5,110 accelerated underwritings, raising a total of $647.6 billion, including 824 ATs
(worth $147.6 billion) involving shares of U.S. firms, 2445 European ATs (worth $351.5 billion), and
5,133 ATs (worth $148.4 billion) from the rest of the world.
The second category, non-accelerated transactions, incorporates all other offering techniques.
Although we will compare ATs to this entire group of seasoned equity underwritings in the empirical
analysis below, Table 1 also breaks the non-AT category down further into four additional classifications
based on the offering type designations in SDC. Firm commitment underwritings include offers
12

Another challenge we face is that there are a very large number of multi-tranche offers. These become much more
common over time (most of the post-2000 deals have multiple tranches), and these tend to be the largest overall
issues. Multiple tranches are especially frequent among privatizations (the 1987 DSM offering had seven individual
tranches, and one of the British Telecom offers had five tranches). Many accelerated deals have multiple tranches as
well; the very first ABO, Allied Lyons in 1991, has two tranches listed. Since the principal focus is on individual
offerings, we examine each tranche separately using SDC’s variable "amount raised in this market" as the offer
amount rather than "amount raised, sum of all markets." This classification poses no problems in comparing issue
characteristics (such as size, underwiter spread, percent primary shares, etc) between accelerated and traditional
marketed deals, but it does complicate interpreting event study results—since every tranche of a share offering is
announced simultaneously. We address this issue in section 5 below.
13
In the vast majority of cases, the AT designation is listed first (block trade/negotiated sale), rather than second
(negotiated sale/block trade), which also supports designating all deals involving any of our three techniques as an
accelerated transaction.
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designated as firm commitment, firm commitment/negotiated sale, firm commitment/placement, and
other offerings including the firm commitment designation. There are 11,010 firm commitment
underwritings raising $1,092.6 billion, of which 6207 (raising $733.7 billion) are from the United States,
328 (raising $36.4 billion) are European, and 4475 (raising $322.5 billion) are from the rest of the world.
There are 1,121 SEOs (raising $81.6 billion) that we categorize as general cash offerings,
including 877 European, 242 ROW, and two US offers raising $53.7 billion, $14.7 billion, and $56
million, respectively. This classification includes issues with the SDC designations of offer for sale, offer
for subscription, open offers and other sales classified as “offers.” The third non-AT category,
placements and allotments, includes offerings designated as placements, third party allotments (virtually
all of which are Japanese) and other sales with “placements” in the offering designation. There are 7,205
placements and allotments, raising $562.4 billion, mostly from Europe (2,651 offers, raising $$293.0
billion) and ROW (3,686 offers, raising $220.8 billion). There are only 868 U.S. placements and
allotments, which raise $48.5 billion.
The three types of non-AT offering methods described above (firm commitment, general cash
offers, and placements and allotments) are all similar in economic terms, since all three involve an
underwritten, public offering of shares principally to investors who are not currently holders of the firm’s
shares. This is also true for the three accelerated underwriting methods, though ATs differ in that they are
conducted much more rapidly and generate either no (block trades and bought deals) or very little (ABOs)
pricing information during the rapid underwriting and marketing process. The final non-AT underwriting
method, rights offerings, differs from all others in being targeted exclusively at the firm’s existing
shareholders. This grouping includes any offer with “rights” listed as one of the offering methods. Rights,
firm commitment/rights, negotiated sale/rights, and rights offers with other names are all included in this
category, which collectively encompasses 6,604 offerings (raising $524.6 billion) from Europe (2114
offers, raising $335.1 billion), the United States (364 offers, raising $24.97 billion), and the rest of the
world (4136 offers, raising $163.8 billion). As described in Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2005), rights
offerings are very common methods of issuing seasoned equity outside of the United States, though our
screen of selecting only underwritten offers removes the more common uninsured rights issues from our
sample and includes only underwritten (standby, or insured) offers.14

14

International seasoned equity offer studies that examine rights offers include Bigelli (1998, Italy), Bøhren, Eckbo,
and Michalsen (1997, Norway), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005, Sweden), Eckbo and Norli (2005, Norway), Gajewski
and Ginglinger (2002, France), Loderer and Zimmerman (1988, Switzerland), Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000, United
Kingdom), and Wu and Wang (2005, Kong Kong). Most of these studies document non-negative market reactions to
announcements of all types of rights issues—and significantly more positive reactions to uninsured rights offer
announcements versus insured rights. Despite this, most of these studies document that underwritten offers are
gaining market share versus non-underwritten offers generally, and specifically that insured rights are being chosen
over uninsured rights wherever regulations allow issuers a choice of offering methods.
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A. The rise of accelerated seasoned equity offering underwritings
Figure 2 shows the evolution of seasoned equity offer underwriting methods from 1991 through
2004 for the three country/regional sub-samples. Table II presents the number and value of SEOs
executed globally, broken down by offering type between those using traditional, fully marketed
underwritings (non-ATs) and those employing some form of accelerated underwriting (Total ATs). Table
II also presents this data separately for the three individual accelerated underwriting methods: accelerated
bookbuilt offerings (ABOs), block trades (BTs), and bought deals (BDs).
**** Insert Figure 2 and Table II about here****
Four key patterns emerge from analyzing the data. First, accelerated underwritings have been
gaining market share steadily since the late 1990s, and very dramatically since 2000. ATs represented
only four percent of all SEOs during 1991-94 and this fraction grew only modestly over the next four
years to 15.9 percent of all SEOs in 1998. As seasoned equity issuance surged to a record $363 billion
during 2000, accelerated deals continued gaining incremental market share, but their phenomenal growth
began only after the new seasoned equity market crashed after March 2000. Whereas the total value of
SEOs worldwide dropped by over 40 percent between 2000 and 2002, the absolute value of ATs
continued to increase. By 2004, accelerated issues accounted for 38.6 percent of the number of
underwritten SEOs, and over 53 percent of total value.15
Second, accelerated underwriting techniques remained largely region-specific until recently. Most
conspicuously, over 90 percent of bought deals are Canadian, whereas two-thirds of ABOs have involved
shares of European issuers. The first block trades were in the United States, and until 2004 the vast
majority of U.S. accelerated underwritings were block trades. Similarly, all the early ABOs were
European (principally British), but this method has been gaining global market share rapidly since
2000. This regional pattern suggests a regulatory factor in defining accelerated underwritings; in Canada
accelerated offerings are structured as bought deals, in America as block trades, and in Europe as ABOs.
Third, accelerated underwritings are on average larger than traditional marketed SEOs in all
regions, and in the U.S. national market. For example, American ABOs are on average half-again larger
than the average SEO ($186.5 million versus $115.5 million), and the average size of ROW block trades
($105.6 million) is 73 percent larger than the average ROW offering ($61.1 million). Share issue
privatizations (SIPs) are the one major exception to the general rule that accelerated underwritings are
larger than marketed deals. SIPs are economically and statistically significantly larger on average than
15

The importance of accelerated underwritings was underscored when the Investment Dealers’ Digest included a
separate listing for “Global Block Trades and Accelerated Bookbuilds” for the first time in its January 9, 2006
annual summary of investment banking league tables. This shows there were 624 accelerated underwritings that
raised $161.2 billion in 2005 (out of $288 billion in total seasoned offerings), versus 847 ATs worth $167.5 billion
in 2004 (out of $275 billion total SEOs). The mid-year 2006 league tables, published in IDD on July 10, 2006, show
that global block trades and accelerated bookbuilds accounted for $70.4 billion of the $158.3 billion raised around
the world through SEOs during the first half of 2006.
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private sector offerings, but this is what the empirical findings of Jones, et al. (1999) and Bortolotti, et al.
(2005) would lead us to expect for political reasons.
Finally, ABOs have shown by far the most dramatic growth of the three accelerated offering
methods. From two each in 1991 and 1992, and zero in 1993, these grew to surpass block trades in value
for the first time in 2001, and by 2004 accounted for over two-thirds of all proceeds raised through
accelerated underwritings. ABOs are likely gaining market share because they differ from block trades
and bought deals in two key ways—speed of execution and assumption of market risk. In BTs and BDs,
banks purchase shares directly from the issuing firm or selling shareholder, usually after winning an
auction, and then sell the shares on to institutional clients as rapidly as possible. In an ABO, the issuing
firm or shareholder awards the winning bank a mandate to very quickly (48 hours or less) arrange an
underwriting syndicate to market the issue, thus allowing some price-risk sharing between issuer and
underwriter. This presumably allows the issue to be placed at a higher net price or allows for larger
offerings at a given price.
The analysis of non-U.S. equity issuance markets reveals wide variability in number and average
size of SEOs, as well as in the market penetration of accelerated underwriting techniques. Whereas
bought deals account for over half of Canadian SEOs between 1991 and 2004 (and over 95 percent of
Canadian accelerated underwritings are BDs), and ABOs alone account for more than one-fourth of
British and Dutch SEO values during this period, accelerated underwritings have been much less
important in other developed markets, especially Asia. Accelerated underwritings account for only 15
percent of Australian SEOs, and less than 10 percent in Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. In all these
countries, however, accelerated deals have been gaining market share rapidly since 2000, and are almost
always larger than traditional underwritten offers. The only country where accelerated underwritings are
not significantly larger than non-accelerated deals is Canada, where the $65.0 million average size of the
936 bought deals is insignificantly different from the $66.5 million average size of non-accelerated
underwritings. However, the median BD offer size of $37.3 million is half again larger than the median
$23.2 million non-AT offer size, so a few very large traditional underwritings (mostly privatizations) are
skewing the non-AT mean offering size upwards.

III. How do accelerated underwritings differ traditional underwritings?
The previous section’s analyses show that accelerated transactions are gaining market share
versus traditional methods of underwriting SEOs, but this alone does not indicate whether ATs are
prospering because they are value-maximizing innovations. It seems plausible that ATs have instead been
forced on issuing firms and selling shareholders by investment banks pushing a new product that benefits
the banks at issuers’ expense. In this section and the next, we examine whether ATs are value-maximizing
innovations adopted by firms and their shareholders because they reduce issuance costs, or are value-
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reducing products that transfer wealth to underwriters. We begin by presenting, in Table III, mean and
median values of key underwriting variables for the full sample of all global SEOs, for non-accelerated
deals, and for both pure accelerated deals (where this designation is assigned exclusively) and mixed
deals, which are designated as a combination of traditional and accelerated underwriting methods. The
table then makes univariate comparisons of these values between accelerated and traditional
underwritings, both for the entire 1991-2004 study period and for the recent, post-crash 2001-2004
period. This allows us to identify trends in underwriting techniques, and perhaps identify how the rise of
accelerated underwritings has prompted a competitive response from banks underwriting traditional
SEOs. This table groups all accelerated methods together, and we also compute similar data for the three
types of accelerated deals individually. We do not present these in the interest of space, though we note
significant findings and the tables are available upon request. Table IV-VI present the same information
and univariate tests as in Table III, but for the sub-samples of seasoned offers from the United States
(US), Europe, and the rest of the world (ROW).
**** Insert Tables III-VI about here ****

A. Time required to complete underwritten seasoned offerings
Several key findings emerge from analyzing these tables. First, accelerated underwritings are
arranged much more rapidly than other SEOs—which, given the label “accelerated” is important but
hardly surprising. On average, 26.4 days elapse between launch and issuance for the global sample of
26,015 SEOs with available data, while the 3,179 pure accelerated deals are arranged in 10.2 days and the
1,038 mixed ATs take 21.1 days, versus 29.0 days for traditional underwritings. The median values
probably provide better measures of the time-lapse typically observed between initiating and actually
placing an SEO, and the differences in medians between ATs and non-AT deals are striking. Whereas the
typical non-AT deal takes 15 days to progress from announcement to issuance, the median completion
time for pure ATs is one day—and mixed ATs are typically completed the same day they are launched
(elapsed time = 0 days)! All of the mean and median comparisons between ATs and non-ATs are highly
significant, both economically and statistically. Interestingly, this is the first academic study we are aware
of that has documented—much less focused on—the time required to actually launch seasoned offers
around the world.
A fascinating pattern emerges from comparing the mean and median elapsed-time values for the
years 2001-2004 (not reported in the table) to those reported in Table 6 for the full 1991-2004 study
period. The average elapsed time between launch and issuance drops significantly for all SEO categories,
but the declines in median elapsed times for all SEOs and non-AT deals are truly phenomenal. The
average elapsed times fall by roughly one-third for all SEOs (from 26.4 to 16.8 days) and for the non-AT
sub-sample (from 29.0 to 19.8 days), but the median elapsed times fall from 12 to one day for all SEOs
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and from 15 to four days for non-ATs. The average elapsed times for pure and mixed accelerated deals
also fall (to 7.4 and 14.4 days, respectively), but the median values are little changed—simply because
these are so low to begin with. The median elapsed time for pure ATs drops from one to zero days, but
remains at zero days (launch = issuance date) for mixed ATs. While we cannot conclusively state that the
rise of ATs caused the massive reduction in mean and (especially) median time required to execute nonaccelerated underwritings, the evidence suggests that from 2001 onwards firms and selling shareholders
wishing or forced by regulation to sell stock through a traditional underwriting sped up their underwriting
procedures in response to the success of accelerated underwritings.
Comparing the speed of execution for the three accelerated methods (results not reported), we
find that pure ABOs and pure BTs are on average sold much more rapidly (5.3 and 6.9 days) than either
pure bought deals (19.3 days) or all non-AT offers. Once again, median elapsed times are much lower
than means—the typical pure and mixed block trades and ABOs all complete their offerings on the days
they are announced (launch = issuance date), both for the full 1991-2004 study period and for the more
recent 2001-2004 period. The sole outliers are bought deals. The average elapsed time between offer
announcement and completion is 19.3 days for the 993 pure bought deals, which is significantly less than
the 29.0 day average for non-ATs, but the pure BD median value is longer for the full study period (20
versus 15 days) and remains at 20 days during 2001-2004, when the non-AT median elapsed time drops
to four days. Since 936 of the bought deals involve shares of Canadian companies, this long (and fixed)
placement period is entirely a result of Canadian regulations. Even here, though, ATs are placed more
rapidly than the alternative, since an in-depth analysis reveals that Canadian BDs take significantly less
time to complete than traditionally underwritten Canadian SEOs.
Tables IV and V show that the same basic pattern of accelerated underwritings requiring less time
to complete than non-accelerated deals holds in the United States and Europe, especially if one focuses on
medians rather than means. The median elapsed time for U.S. and European pure ATs is zero days for
both periods, while the median elapsed time for U.S. mixed ATs (we ignore the seven European mixed
ATs) is five days for the full sample period and two days during 2001-2004. In comparison, the median
U.S. non-accelerated underwriting requires a surprisingly long 31 days to complete during 1991-2004,
and this drops only to 22 days during 2001-2004. In contrast, over the full study period European nonATs are arranged in a median six days, which is significantly longer than for European ATs, but this falls
to the same zero days as for ATs during 2001-2004. Assessing issue execution times in the ROW sample
detailed in Table VI is once more complicated by the importance of the 936 Canadian bought deals in the
sample of 1,218 pure ATs, which have a median 19 day elapsed time between launch and issuance for the
full sample period, which falls only to 18 days during 2001-2004. The 11,118 ROW non-accelerated
offers have a median elapsed time of 3 days during 1991-2004 (which is significantly longer than the zero
day median for the 608 mixed ATs), but this falls to a median of zero days for 2001-2004. In other
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words, the execution time for all categories of seasoned offerings is falling, and in most cases falling
dramatically.

B. Offer size and issuing firm market capitalization
The second through fourth rows of Tables III-VI examine, respectively, SEO offer size (in 2004
U.S. dollars), relative issue size, and the pre-offering market capitalization of the firm selling new shares
(in a primary offer) or the firm whose shares are being sold (in a secondary offering). The mean (median)
size of a global SEO during 1991-2004 is $94.6 million ($26.4 million), it is executed by a firm with an
average total market capitalization of $8,907 million ($383 million), and the relative issue size equals a
mean 11.7 percent (7.0 percent) of the firm’s pre-offer capitalization. We are unaware of an existing
global SEO study to which we can compare these mean and median values, though as we will show the
country/regional samples are comparable in size to what has been reported elsewhere.
For the full sample of all SEOs and for the country/regional sub-samples, accelerated offerings
are always dramatically and significantly larger than traditional marketed deals, and are executed by (or
involve the shares of) larger, more valuable companies—but are smaller in size relative to the firm’s
existing total capitalization. Comparing the absolute and relative sizes of accelerated and non-accelerated
offers and offering firms reveals that global non-AT offerings raise an average of $88.2 million ($23.3),
are executed by or with the shares of firms with an average (median) market value of $6,863 million
($287 million), and the offering is equal to a mean 12.7 percent (7.0 percent) of the firm’s pre-offer
market capitalization. Pure accelerated offerings are executed by firms with an average market value of
$15,656 million ($788 million), and raise an average of $116.6 million ($34.3 million), with an average
relative issue size of 8.4 percent (5.0 percent). Mixed ATs are even larger offers—$24.3 million mean,
$52.1 million median—from firms with average market capitalizations of $22,696 million ($1,057
million), but the mean relative issue size of 5.9 percent (4.0 percent) for these ATs is also significantly
smaller than for non-ATs. These patterns of larger absolute but smaller relative issue sizes—involving
shares of more valuable companies—for accelerated deals are also observed for the individual accelerated
techniques ABOs and BTs, though not for BDs. The average size of pure bought deals, $67.9 million, is
significantly smaller than the $88.2 million average for non-ATs, though the pure bought deal median
value of $37.1 million is significantly larger than the $23.3 million non-AT median offer size. This again
reflects the peculiarity of Canadian bought deals, which are smaller on average than seasoned offers from
other countries, but are larger than non-accelerated Canadian SEOs.
An intriguing pattern emerges from observing how mean and median offer sizes differ between
the full 1991-2004 study period and the more recent 2001-2004 period. For all categories of offers other
than U.S. issues, the average and median offer size declines substantially over time. The mean (median)
offer size for the world’s 30,945 SEOs with available data is $85.2 million ($15.6 million) during 2001-
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2004, compared to $94.6 million ($26.4 million) for the full sample period. The same pattern is observed
for global pure and mixed ATs, global non-ATs, all three individual accelerated transaction samples, and
for all categories of European and ROW seasoned offerings. Only in the United States—where almost all
categories of SEOs have larger mean and median offer sizes than their comparators in other countries—
does one observe mixed evidence of changing issue sizes during 2001-2004 compared to 1991-2004. The
mean and median size of U.S. non-AT offers increases over time, from $108.5 million and $58.9 million
to $124.8 million and $73.3 million, respectively, as does (trivially, from $70.5 million to $71.6 million)
the median pure AT offer size.16 The mean and median offer size of all other U.S. seasoned offering
categories decline during 2001-2004 compared to the full period. There is no obvious explanation for this
generalized, worldwide decline in offer size over time. This may reflect increasing efficiency of global
capital markets, allowing ever smaller firms to issue stock over time, or it may simply reflect exchanges’
eagerness to welcome seasoned offers to offset the dramatically reduced number of firms executing IPOs
after the market crash in 2000.

C. Primary, secondary, and mixed offer fractions
Although few empirical studies examine the relative fraction of newly-issued primary shares and
already-existing secondary shares in seasoned equity offerings, the handful that do show that primary
shares account for between two-thirds and three-fourths of the typical SEO over time.17 Supplemental
(unreported) analyses show that, with one exception (bought deals), accelerated offerings always have a
smaller fraction of capital-raising primary shares than traditional SEOs. Whereas primary shares account
for 73.3 percent of all global SEOs, and for an even larger fraction (77.1 percent) of the world’s
traditionally underwritten deals, primary shares represent only 54.4 percent of global mixed ATs and 51.6
percent of the world’s pure ATs. This means that roughly half of all shares in accelerated underwritings
are divestments of existing shareholdings by institutional or (usually) corporate investors. Accelerated
deals involve much lower fractions of primary shares in all the country/regional markets as well. In the
United States, primary shares account for 76.3 percent of non-accelerated SEOs during the full sample
period, versus a weighted average 69.8 percent for all accelerated deals (62.3 percent for the 328 pure

16

Not surprisingly, these mean and median SEO offer sizes are comparable to those presented in other recent U.S.
empirical studies. The average (median) constant dollar offer size of the 1,114 SEOs from 1975-2001 studied by
Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) is $104.8 million ($61.3 million), while Butler, Grullon, and Weston’s (2005)
2,387 SEOs from 1993-2000 have a $130 million average ($74 million median) offer size.
17
Most empirical studies screen out pure secondary offers, either by deliberate choice (to examine only shares
issued by firms) or because the study has an inherent objective of examining capital-raising choices (as in studies of
rights offerings or shelf registrations). Studies of U.S. seasoned offerings that include pure secondary offers include
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Hess and Bhagat (1986), Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), Smart and Zutter
(2002), Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), and Heron and Lie (2004). We are unaware of any non-U.S. seasoned offer
studies emphasizing the relative fractions of primary and secondary shares, though Huyghebaert and van Hull
(2006) make this choice the motivating feature of their study of Belgian IPOs.
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ATs and 74.8 percent for the 496 mixed ATs). Primary shares account for 81.9 percent of non-accelerated
ROW offerings, but for only 65.3 percent of the weighted average ROW accelerated deals (62.3 percent
for the 328 pure ATs and 74.8 percent for the 496 mixed ATs).
The difference between primary and secondary share fractions in accelerated versus nonaccelerated underwritings is especially striking in Europe, where primary shares account for 68.1 percent
of traditional SEOs, but for only 38.7 percent of the shares in pure ATs (which account for all but two
percent of European ATs). This comparison says much about how the rise of ATs has affected European
corporate finance, since access to accelerated underwritings has allowed European corporate and
institutional investors to aggressively unwind cross-shareholdings. Our supplemental readings of press
releases from Lexis/Nexis indicate that many European sellers are using ATs for precisely this reason.18
Comparing the primary versus secondary share mix of individual accelerated underwriting
methods reveals sharp differences. Whereas primary shares represent 77.1 of the world’s non-AT
offerings during 1991-2004, these shares account for only 58.1 percent of a weighted average of global
ABOs and for a mere 24.1 percent of global block trades. On the other hand, primary shares represent the
bulk (93.2 percent) of a weighted average of the 1,019 global bought deals, again reflecting the
disproportionate influence of 936 Canadian BDs. Clearly, Canadian corporations have become very fond
of raising new equity using bought deals.

D. Number of underwriters
The last offer characteristic we examine is the number of investment banks involved in the
syndicate underwriting an SEO. To our knowledge, no other academic study has considered this variable,
though we show its importance for both issuers and underwriters. The values in the sixth line of Tables
III-VI show that accelerated underwriting syndicates involve significantly fewer investment banks than do
syndicates for traditional SEOs. The average syndicate size for pure (mixed) accelerated deals is 2.52
banks (2.13 banks), versus 3.18 banks for traditional SEOs. Pure ABOs have especially small average
syndicate sizes (1.75 banks), as do both pure and mixed block trades (averages of 1.17 and 1.09 banks,
respectively). We also calculate that only 34.2 percent of accelerated transactions are syndicated to
include more than one bank in the underwriting syndicate, whereas 45.8 percent of non-accelerated deals
are syndicated. Both the smaller number of banks in the average accelerated underwriting syndicates and
the lower frequency of syndicating ATs are even more remarkable because accelerated offers typically
raise half again as much as do traditional offers, in half the time. This may be because far less information
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Recent European secondary sales of inter-corporate holdings, executed using accelerated methods, are discussed
in Bickerton (2002, Netherlands), Brown-Humes (2001, Sweden), Daniel (2001, France), Hall (2002, Switzerland),
Jenkins (2001, Britain), Levitt (2003, Spain), Lucas (2004, European banks), and Major (2000, Germany).
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gathering and marketing by underwriting banks is required for accelerated deals. Additionally,
accelerated deals involve aspects of both competitive and negotiated underwriting contracts; banks must
compete for underwriting mandates, but this competition is organized very quickly for issuing firms or
selling shareholders.20 Accelerated deals are also similar to private placements, in that shares are sold
exclusively to institutional (non-retail) investors, but differ in that ATs involve underwritten offerings of
fully tradable, listed shares.

IV. Are accelerated underwritings less costly for issuers?
Having documented how accelerated underwritings differ from traditional underwritings in terms
of offering and placements characteristics, we can now examine whether accelerated deals are more or
less costly for issuing firms and selling shareholders than are marketed deals. To make a direct cost
comparison between AT and non-AT deals, it helps to define the components of issuing cost for a firm or
shareholder selling stock to public investors. As discussed in Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2006) and
Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), empirical research has identified three separate valuation impacts relating
to the typical seasoned equity offering, most of which are negative (costs). These are (1) the
announcement period market impact, calculated as the abnormal return experienced by holders of the
firm’s stock following announcement of an SEO; (2) the underwriting spread—also called the offer price
discount—calculated as the percentage difference between the stock’s offering price and the previous
trading day’s closing price; and (3) the offering day return, or underpricing, defined as the percentage
change in value experienced by investors who purchase shares at the offer price and hold these until the
close of trading on the offer day.
Empirical evidence overwhelmingly shows that the announcement of an SEO typically causes a
U.S. firm’s stock price to fall, generally by 2-3 percent.21 However, empirical studies employing non-U.S.
19

Benveniste and Spindt (1989) explain how investment bankers provide investors with an incentive to reveal their
demand for a firm’s shares. This information revelation model is recently tested in Cornelli and Goldreich (2001,
2003), Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004), with mixed results. Both Cornelli and
Goldreich studies, and the Aggarwal, et al. study, support the idea that bookbuilding is informative and that
informative bidders are rewarded with better share allocations, while Jenkinson and Jones find little evidence that
bids are informative or that large bidders are rewarded with preferential share allocations. Finally, Sherman and
Titman (2003) model the tradeoff a lead underwriter faces when increasing the size of the underwriting syndicate.
They find that increasing the size of the syndicate by inviting in more investors increases pricing accuracy—by
incorporating more information—but at the cost of greater underpricing.
20
Bhagat (1986), Bhagat and Frost (1986), and Hansen and Khanna (1994) examine the choice between
competitive and negotiated offerings and find lower costs in negotiated deals. However, competitive offers may only
appear to be less costly because the types of firms that use them are different from the types of firms that use
negotiated offers. Logue and Tiniç (1999) examine multiple offers by the same firm, AT&T, and find no cost
differences in the two offer types. Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) develop and empirically verify a model
demonstrating how issuing firms and IB underwriters associaite by mutual choice. Though it seems obvious that
firms and IBs should choose each other, previous theoretical models had in fact posited a unidirectional choice.
21
The following U.S. studies all show average announcement period cumulative abnormal returns of between -2.0
percent and -2.7 percent: Hess and Bhagat (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990),
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samples generally show positive (or, at worst, insignificantly negative) announcement period abnormal
returns.22 Underwriting spreads have also been extensively researched, and recent research suggests that
spreads for U.S. seasoned offerings are in the range of 4.4 to 5.5 percent [Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao
(1996), Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000), Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2003), Mola and Loughran (2004),
Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005), and Butler, Nanda, and Warther (2005)], spreads are lower for shelfregistered than for traditionally underwritten offerings [Butler, Nanda, and Warther (2005)], spreads are
lower for highly liquid firms than for firms with thinly traded stocks [Butler, Grullon, and Weston
(2005)], and spreads have generally been declining over time [Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2003)]. There
are far fewer empirical studies examining spreads on non-U.S. seasoned offerings, but Slovin, Sushka,
and Lai (2000) show that average spreads for British placings (6.1 percent) are much higher than for
insured (4.6 percent) and uninsured rights (0.4 percent) and Ljunqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003)
document that spreads for non-U.S. initial public offerings average less than half those of American IPOs.
The principal source of variability in spreads on seasoned offerings revolves around whether the
issue is a rights offering to current shareholders or a cash offering to outside investors. Non-U.S rights
offerings generally have discounts of 20 percent or more [Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000, Britain),
Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002, France), Wu and Wang (2005, Hong Kong), Bigelli (1998, Italy)],
whereas discounts on comparable public offerings are in the 3-5 percent range. U.S. studies generally find
discounts of 1.5-3.5 percent, which have been increasing over time [Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), Corwin
(2003), and Mola and Loughran (2004)].
Finally, the underpricing of U.S. seasoned offers has been initially studied by Eckbo and Masulis
(1992) for a sample of firm commitments of utility and industrial firms over the 1963-1961 period,
finding an average underpricing very close to zero. Several studies have documented an increase in SEO
underpricing during the 90s. Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003) and Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2003), and
Corwin (2003) finding average first day returns to investors who purchase shares at the offer price in the

Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000), Altinkiliç and Hansen (2003), and Heron and
Lie (2004). Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find much more negative announcement period CARs, -3.56 percent, but
their study only examines 80 SEOs, mostly from the 1970s. Schipper and Smith (1986) document the intriguing
findings that equity carve-out announcements are associated with significantly positive (+1.8 percent) abnormal
returns for parent-firm stocks, but announcements that parent companies are themselves issuing stock yield
significantly negative returns (-3.5 percent). Finally, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) show that the market impact of
SEO announcements is significantly less negative (-2.0 percent versus -3.3 percent) during hot issuance periods than
during periods when fewer SEOs are executed.
22
Non-U.S. studies documenting significantly positive announcement period CARs for SEO announcements include
Wu and Wang (2005, Hong Kong), Bigelli (1998, Italy), Cooney, Kato, and Schallheim (2003, Japan), Kang and
Stulz (1996, Japan), Eckbo and Norli (2005, Norway), and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2006, Sweden). Slovin, Sushka,
and Lai (2000) find that placings [general cash offers] are associated with significantly positive (+3.31 percent)
announcement period CARs, whereas rights offering announcements yield roughly symmetrical, significantly
negative (-3.09 percent) returns. Finally, Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002, France) document insignificantly negative
announcement period CARs for public offers, but significantly negative CARs for both types of rights offers
examined. These and other international studies are summarized in Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2006).
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range of 2.6 – 2.9 percent, likely due to the increase in the share of more risky Nasdaq issuers. To our
knowledge, no single study provides systematic evidence on SEO underpricing in European issues or in
the rest of the world. In the next, we will try to fill this gap.
Measuring an SEO’s announcement effect, as well as the underwriting spread and underpricing
associated with the offer, requires definitive announcement and issue dates. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003)
report an issue date error rate of roughly 50 percent in the SDC database, so we follow their procedure of
identifying the dates on which offers occur by searching Datastream for a significant volume spike near
the SDC issue date. Specifically, we track volume over an 11-day window centered on the SDC issue
date, and we identify the true issue date as the date on which trading volume is several times larger than
the prior day. In most cases, there is no conflict between issue dates, and when we identify a conflict, it is
typically a single day. Furthermore, since there is no systematic drift in the closing prices of offering
firms during a three day window around the offering, misidentification of the true issue date should not
bias our analysis of discounts and underpricing.
SDC identifies a “launch date” for each SEO which typically precedes the issue date. In an
attempt to identify clean SEO announcement dates, we compared SDC launch dates to announcement
dates found by searching Lexis/Nexis for a random subsample of deals. For each of the randomly
selected transactions drawn from the full sample, we searched for SEO announcements on Lexis/Nexis
over a two-month window centered on the SDC launch date. In the U.S., the dates we verified on
Lexis/Nexis almost always fell within one or two days of the SDC launch date, so a relatively narrow
announcement date window of -1,+1 around the launch date captures the true announcement effect of the
deal in most cases. For SEOs conducted outside the U.S., the correspondence between Lexis/Nexis
announcement dates (when we could find them) and SDC launch dates was much lower. This suggests
that researchers conducting event study analysis of SEO announcement dates drawn from SDC may
report abnormal returns biased toward zero. In our event study analysis, we report abnormal returns only
for those transactions for which we have searched Lexis/Nexis to obtain announcement dates. We also
calculate announcement period abnormal returns using several different event windows.

A. Underwriter spreads for accelerated versus traditional offerings
Table III shows that global accelerated offerings have significantly—both statistically and
economically—lower gross spreads than do traditional SEOs. Whereas underwriting spreads for
23

For completeness, we also note that several researchers [Kang and Stulz (1996, Japan), Loderer, Sheehan, and
Kadlec (1991, United States), Median (2005, United States)] examine offer period return, defined as the return to
investors from the close of trading the day before an SEO through the close of trading on the offer day, and
generally find small though significantly negative CARs of about -1.0 to -2.0 percent. However, it is not clear that
these returns really represent a true cost to the issuing firm or selling shareholder, at least not a cost distinct from
that already captured by discounts and underpricing. We calculate offer day returns for all of our samples but do not
report these, since they are usually quite small. These are available upon request.
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traditional SEOs average 4.79 percent, spreads on pure ATs are 3.59 and mixed AT spreads average 4.21
percent of the offering price. While AT spreads are significantly higher than non-AT spreads in the
United States (3.10 percent for pure and 3.15 percent for mixed ATs versus 2.53 percent for non-ATs)
spreads on accelerated deals are only one-half those on marketed deals in Europe (3.46 percent for pure
and 3.30 percent for mixed ATs versus 7.07 percent for non-ATs) and are significantly lower for mixed
ATs (6.48 percent versus 5.54 percent for non-ATs) in the rest of the world.
Since ATs are substantially larger than non-AT underwritings, it is unsurprising that spreads are
significantly lower on these offerings, since Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) and others document major
economies of scale—due to the importance of fixed costs—in securities underwriting. To examine
whether AT offerings have significantly lower spreads after other factors, particularly issue size, are
accounted for, we run several OLS regressions. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table VII.
**** Insert Table VII about here ****
These results suggest that even after controlling for other characteristics that affect the gross
spread, accelerated transactions reduce spreads. As expected, larger offerings are associated with smaller
spreads. U.S. seasoned equity offers have spreads that are, ceteris paribus, around 370 basis points lower
than ROW offerings, while European offer spreads are about 20 basis points lower than ROW offerings.
Most critically, accelerated transactions significantly reduce spreads; pure accelerated transaction spreads
are, on average, 253 basis points lower than non-accelerated deals. Intriguingly, spreads on ABOs are
statistically and economically significantly lower than spreads on the other two types of accelerated
underwritings. Since the seller shares some price risk with underwriting banks while the ABO is being
arranged—in contrast to BTs and BDs, which are pure auctions—this result suggests that the risk sharing
reduces direct underwriting costs. This may partly explain why ABOs have been gaining SEO
underwriting market share so strongly in recent years.

B. Underpricing of accelerated versus traditional offerings
Our data confirms that ATs also allow issuers to reap substantial savings in one of the main
indirect floatation costs, namely underpricing. For the whole sample, we report an average underpricing
of slightly less than 3 percent for ATs, while it is 4.8 percent for non-AT transactions. Thus accelerated
deals leave less money on the table than other types of SEO. As Table 3 shows, as compared with nonATs, average underpricing is quite similar when mixed or pure ATs are considered, while some
interesting regional differences appear. As Tables IV-VI show, average undepricing in the U.S. is
markedly lower than any other region of the world, and especially so as far as non-AT offers are
concerned. The U.S. also reveals the lowest difference in underpricing between ATs and non-ATs (78
basis points) while ATs become particularly appealing in comparison to fully marketed offering in
Europe, boasting a difference of 4.8 and 4.3 percentage points for mixed and pure ATs, respectively.
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Regression analyses reported in Table VII corroborate the descriptive analysis. Reassuringly, we
find that ATs are significantly less underpriced than any other type of SEOs. The same result holds when
pure and mixed ATs are estimated separately, with an economically larger effect attributed to pure deals.
U.S. markets stand out for being most competitive relative to the rest of the world, while the opposite
holds for Europe and Canada. As in several other studies, we also find that larger deals are significantly
less undepriced. Indeed, economies of scale appear relevant for a more accurate pricing of SEOs.
Interestingly, capital raising offerings are shown to be particularly costly for issuers as a larger fraction of
primary shares increases significantly underpricing. Interestingly, we find that ABOs are significantly
less underpriced than other types of ATs.

C. Market impact of accelerated and traditional SEO underwriting announcements
For the randomly selected subsample of deals for which we verified announcement dates using
Lexis/Nexis, we compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the three-day period from one
trading day before to one trading day after the SEO announcement date (-1, +1). We compute abnormal
returns using the market model, which defines expected return as a function of the stock’s beta and the
reference market’s return. Table VIII presents mean and median announcement period abnormal returns
for the full (global) sample of SEO announcements, as well as for the 326 accelerated and 1598 nonaccelerated deals and regional sub-samples. For the full sample and for each sub-sample, this table also
presents event study results for pure primary, pure secondary, and mixed primary and secondary
offerings. We also test the robustness of our results by measuring abnormal returns over windows of (2,+2) and (-3,+3), and by calculating market-adjusted returns rather than relying on the market model.
None of these alternatives changes our results systematically.
**** Insert Table VIII about here ****
The overall average CAR for the global sample of 1924 seasoned equity offering announcements
is a significant -1.17 percent, while the median is -1.46 percent. The 326 accelerated deals have average
(median) announcement period CAR of -1.22 percent (-1.33 percent) versus -1.16 percent (-1.49 percent)
for the 1598 non-AT offerings. While both of these average CARs are significantly negative, the small
0.06 percentage point difference between AT and non-AT deals is not. Examining announcement period
abnormal results for the sub-samples based on whether the offering involves existing or newly-issued
shares yields striking and highly significant results. The average -2.23 percent (median -2.08 percent)
CAR for the 381 pure secondary offerings is 1.85 percentage points more negative than the -0.38 percent
(-1.07 percent) average CAR for the 1236 pure primary offers, and this difference is significant at the one
percent level. The 307 mixed primary and secondary offers also have much more negative CAR (-3.06
percent mean, -2.61 percent median) than do the primary share offerings. This suggests that global
investors view announcements that current shareholders are selling stock to be much worse news than
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announcements that the firm itself is selling new equity capital. As we are unaware of any existing multinational SEO announcement period event studies, or any event studies (even of U.S. offerings) examining
differential effects of primary versus secondary offerings, the findings detailed above are unique
contributions to the empirical literature.
The average CAR for the U.S. sample of 875 SEO announcements is -2.89 percent, while the
median is -2.28 percent. These values are reassuringly consistent with previous U.S. seasoned offering
event studies that find CARs of between -2 and -3 percent. The 97 accelerated deals have average
(median) announcement period CAR of -1.34 percent (-1.95 percent), which is insignificantly different
from zero, whereas the 778 non-AT offerings have a highly significantly negative average CAR of -3.08
percent (-2.30 percent). Though substantial, this 1.75 percentage point difference between AT and nonAT deals is not statistically significant. Secondary, mixed, and pure primary offerings all have
significantly negative average CARs—of -3.23 percent, -3.51 percent, and -2.45 percent, respectively—
but the 0.77 percentage point difference between pure secondary and pure primary offerings is not
statistically significant.
The average CAR for the European sample of 307 SEO announcements is -0.23 percent, which is
not significantly different from zero, while the median is -0.15 percent. The 107 accelerated deals have
average (median) announcement period CAR of -0.79 percent (-1.03 percent) versus +0.06 percent (-0.04
percent) for the 200 non-AT offerings. This 0.85 percentage point difference between AT and non-AT
deals is insignificant at normal significance levels. Secondary offering announcements have significantly
negative announcement period returns (-1.27 percent mean, -0.85 percent median), but the -1.49 percent
and +0.69 percent CARs for mixed and pure primary offerings are not significantly different from zero
and the 1.97 percentage point difference between pure primary and pure secondary offering CARs,
though large, is insignificant.
Finally, the average CAR for the rest-of-world sample of 742 SEO announcements is +0.47
percent, which is not significantly different from zero, and the median is -0.87 percent. The 122
accelerated deals have significantly negative average (median) announcement period CAR of -1.51
percent (-1.25 percent) versus +0.86 percent (-0.78 percent) for the 620 non-AT offerings. For the first
time, this 2.36 percentage point difference between AT and non-AT deals is statistically significant. The
120 pure secondary offering announcements have much more negative announcement period CAR (-2.15
percent mean, -2.14 percent median) than do the 596 primary offers (+0.99 percent mean, -0.68 percent
median), and this 3.13 percentage points difference is significant at the one percent level.
In Table 12 we present a cross-sectional analysis of the announcement CARs. The first
regression model uses dummy variables to distinguish the effects of pure and mixed AT deals versus nonAT transactions. The second specification replaces the pure AT dummy with dummies for each of the
different types of accelerated transactions: accelerated bookbuilt offers, block trades, and bought deals.
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The results indicate that AT offerings have announcement effects comparable to non-AT deals.
Announcement effects are significantly more negative for U.S. deals and for deals with a higher fraction
of secondary shares.
We can summarize these event study results as indicating that announcements of accelerated
offerings have market impacts that are generally similar to announcements of traditional SEOs. The
CARs for ATs are insignificantly higher in the U.S., insignificantly lower in Europe, and significantly
lower in ROW, but the average overall market reaction is virtually identical between AT and traditional
offers. Most dramatically, we find that secondary share offerings (offers of existing shares by selling
shareholders) have a far larger and more negative market impact than do primary, capital-raising offers of
newly created shares in the full sample, and in the ROW subsample.

V. Summary and conclusions
Seasoned common stock sales executed through the three types of accelerated underwitings—
block trades, bought deals and accelerated bookbuilt offerings—have raised over $850 billion since 1998,
and now account for over half of U.S. seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and over two-thirds of European
SEOs. We examine offering terms and announcement-period market impacts of 31,242 SEOs executed
around the world during 1991-2004, which raised over $2.9 trillion for issuing firms (in primary offers)
and selling shareholders (in secondary offers). We show that accelerated deals have become popular with
issuers for several reasons, most notably because they are faster and cheaper than marketed deals, expose
the issuer to less price risk during the short underwriting period, and have comparable announcementperiod market impacts. On average, accelerated deals reduce total issuance costs by about 250 basis
points, but the cost reduction for European sellers is closer to 400 basis points. Our analysis of European
accelerated SEOs suggests that these techniques are helping unwind the traditional cross-shareholdings
that have typified European corporate finance for a century.
Ours is the first truly global event study analysis of the market impact of SEO announcements, as
well as one of the first to show that pure secondary and mixed primary and secondary SEOs yield
significantly more negative announcement period abnormal returns than do capital-raising, primary
offers. We also present a unique analysis of the size of SEO investment banking syndicates—illustrating
that accelerated deals yield much smaller, more capital intensive, and presumably riskier underwriting
syndicates, but these generate comparable revenues over much shorter transactions periods and allow
banks to effectively “buy” market share and league table rankings. Finally, we document that rapid,
auction-like underwriting is indeed becoming the norm for seasoned equity offerings, but not for IPOs.
This should help resolve the academic finance debate on the relative merits of issuing securities by
auction versus by intermediated sales. We conclude that this rapid, worldwide shift towards accelerated
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underwriting is commoditizing seasoned equity sales, and creating a spot market for SEOs. This
represents the long-predicted shift towards an auction model for seasoned equity sales.
Taken together, our findings highlight three major trends that are shaping global investment
banking. First, the fact that accelerated deals are marketed almost exclusively to institutional investors,
and that these underwriting methods are gaining market share, suggests the declining importance of retail
investors to equity markets everywhere. Second, the rise of accelerated deals both promotes and reflects
increasing concentration in the investment banking industry, since only the largest banks have the capital
base and risk tolerance required to buy large share blocks outright and assume all or almost all of the
price risk of later resale. Finally, increasing use of accelerated underwritings for seasoned equity offerings
points to the commoditization of financial transactions with low asymmetric information. Since ATs can
only be employed for shares of large and well known companies, these offerings are executed very
quickly and cheaply—in much the same way plain vanilla corporate bonds are sold—and with minimal
need for the placement and marketing services investment banks employ for IPOs and other nontransparent security offerings.
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Figure 1. Global Seasoned Equity Offerings, Total Deal Value by Type (1991-2004)
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This chart shows the evolution of global seasoned equity offerings for the 1991-2004 period. The series refer to the total deal value (in constant
US$2004 billions) raised by accelerated (mixed and pure) bookbuilt offerings (ABO), block trades, bought deals and all other types of non
accelerated transactions.

Source: Securities Data Corporation, Global New Issues Database
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Figure 2. Global Seasoned Equity Offerings, Deal Value by Region and Type (1991-1999 and 2000-2004)

These charts show the regional distribution of seasoned equity offerings for the 1991-1999 and 2000-2004 sub-periods. The histograms refer to the
total deal value (in constant US$2004 billions) raised by accelerated (mixed and pure) bookbuilt offerings (ABO), block trades, bought deals and
all other types of non accelerated transactions.
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Table I: Underwritten Seasoned Equity Offerings, Classified by Offering Technique, 1991-2004
This table classifies underwritten seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), executed between January 1, 1991 and
December 31, 2004, by offering technique, as described in the Securities Data Corporation New Issue
Database. Data are presented for global SEOs, as well as offerings by issuers from the United States, Europe,
and the rest of the world. The first row presents the number of offers, followed by the total value [in US$
millions] of all such offers, and their average size [in US$ millions].

Offering classification
Total
I. Accelerated transactions

Pure accelerated book-built
offerings (ABO)
Mixed accelerated book-built
offerings (ABO)
Pure block trades (BT)

Mixed block trades (BT)

Pure bought deals (BD)

Mixed bought deals (BD)

II. Firm Commitment
underwritings
Firm commitment offers (FC)

Firm commitment/Negotiated
sales (FC/NS)
Firm commitment/Placements

Other firm commitment offers
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Global
31,242
$2,926,204
($93.7)
5,110
$647,598
($126.7)
1,754
$237,605
($135.5)
596
$73,119
($122.7)
51,197
$184,411
($154.1)
542
$80,744
($149.0)
997
$67,524
($67.7)
24
$4,195
($174.8)
11,010
$1,092,587
($99.2)
3,602
$200,892
($55.8)
6,600
$833,727
($126.3)
747
$38,390
($81.0)
60
$19,578
($326.3)

United States
8270
$955,274
($115.5)
824
$147,633
($179.2)
69
$8,062
($116.8)
250
$46,583
($186.3)
238
$37,901
($159.2)
251
$54,193
($215.9)
16
$894
($55.9)
0
0
0
6,207
$733,704
($118.2)
53
$3,830
($72.3)
6,153
$729,873
($118.6)
0
0
0
1
$0.4
($0.4)

Europe
8,546
$1,089,482
($127.5)
2,445
$351,529
($143.8)
1,598
$220,797
($138.2)
32
$2,650
($82.8)
790
$124,891
($158.1)
12
$1,452
($121.0)
13
$1,739
($133.8)
0
0
0
328
$36,375
($110.9)
201
$6,932
($34.5)
119
$29,321
($246.4)
0
0
0
8
$122
($15)

Rest of world
14,426
$881,447
($61.1)
1,841
$148,436
($80.6)
87
$8,746
($100.5)
314
$23,886
($76.1)
169
$21,619
($127.9)
279
$25,099
($90.0)
968
$64,891
($67.0)
24
$4,195
($174.8)
4,475
$322,509
($72.1)
3,348
$190,130
($56.8)
328
$74,533
($227.2)
747
$38,390
($81.0)
51
$19,456
($381.5)
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III. General Cash Offerings

Offer for sale

Offer for subscription

Open offer

Other offers

IV. Placements and Allotments

Placements

Other placements

Third party allotments

V. Rights Offerings

Rights

Firm commitment/Rights

Negotiated sale/rights

Other rights
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1,121
$81,649
($72.8)
265
$51,218
($193.3)
158
$16,198
($102.5)
305
$5,482
($18.0)
393
$8,751
($22.3)
7,205
$562,375
($78.1)
6,154
$469,701
($76.3)
99
$5,223
($52.8)
952
$87,451
($91.9)
6,604
$524,602
($79.4)
4,936
$460,832
($93.4)
1,301
$31,920
($24.5)
352
$31,312
($89.0)
13
$538
($41.4)

2
$56
($28)
0
0
0
1
$38
($18)
1
$18
($18)
0
0
0
868
$48,542
($55.9)
868
$48,542
($55.9)
0
0
0
0
0
0
364
$24,966
($68.6)
40
$3,872
($96.8)
0
0
0
324
$21,094
($65.1)
0
0
0

877
$53,744
($61.3)
125
$36,518
($292.1)
95
$3,251
($34.2)
271
$5,236
($19.3)
386
$8,739
($22.7)
2,651
$293,037
($110.5)
2,647
$292,838
($110.6)
4
$199
($49.8)
0
0
0
2,114
$335,840
($158.9)
2,089
$328,094
($157.1)
2
$106
($53.0)
11
$7,106
($646.0)
12
$534
($44.5)

242
$27,849
($115.1)
140
$14,700
($105.0)
62
$12,909
($208.2)
33
$228
($6.9)
7
$12
($1.7)
3,686
$220,796
($59.9)
2,639
$128,321
($48.6)
95
$5,024
($52.9)
952
$87,451
($91.9)
4,126
$163,796
($39.7)
2,807
$128,866
($45.9)
1,301
$31,814
($24.5)
17
$3,112
($183.1)
1
$4
($4)
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Table II: Summary Statistics, Global Seasoned Equity Offerings, 1991-2004
This table shows the number and value of all underwritten and all accelerated underwritten seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), executed between
January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2004, around the world by year and by accelerated underwriting technique, as described in the Securities Data
Corporation New Issue Database.
Global SEOs
Year
# Issues
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total

1,099
1,283
1,564
1,603
1,540
2,209
2,386
2,140
2,491
2,869
3,012
2,836
2,987
3,223
31,242
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US$ mn
(constant)
91,904
71,745
120,306
121,957
132,171
193,921
256,888
237,946
316,549
363,295
238,636
208,754
251,418
320,714
2,926,204

Total ATs
(pure and mixed)
# Issues
US$ mn
(constant)
10
2,509
9
730
68
7,847
55
4,880
71
8,052
106
13,160
250
35,374
257
37,710
313
46,215
365
66,532
618
71,969
697
86,593
1,047
92,950
1,244
173,078
5,110
647,598

All ABOs
(pure and mixed)
# Issues
US$ mn
(constant)
2
1,022
2
48
0
0
1
52
5
203
6
408
8
296
72
9,850
81
15,272
101
26,553
249
37,638
387
55,381
644
45,911
784
116,952
2,342
309,587

All Block Trades
(pure and mixed)
# Issues
US$ mn
(constant)
6
1,319
5
443
14
1,669
8
780
25
2,798
48
9,160
166
28,583
110
22,276
163
28,073
184
33,970
257
29,952
155
20,032
258
37,101
326
47,513
1,725
263,668

All Bought Deals
(pure and mixed)
# Issues
US$ mn
(constant)
2
168
2
238
54
6,178
46
4,048
41
5,050
50
3,549
76
6,495
73
5,554
69
2,870
80
6,009
112
4,379
146
9,846
141
9,188
128
8,086
1,020
71,658

32

Megginson et al.: The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity Underwritings

32
Table III: Univariate Comparisons between Accelerated Transactions (AT) and Traditional (Non-AT) Underwritings, Global Seasoned
Equity Offerings, 1991-2004
This table shows the mean, the median values of the main variables of interest for the global seasoned equity offerings, non-accelerated
transactions, pure and mixed accelerated transactions (AT) and their difference in means between non accelerated and pure AT, and non
accelerated and mixed AT. t-statistics are reported in brackets. a indicates significance at the 1%, b at the 5% level, respectively.
Measure

Time from launch date to issue date [days]

Means
Medians
Obs.
Issue proceeds
Means
[constant 2004US$ millions]
Medians
Obs.
Relative Issue Size [%]
Means
Medians
Obs.
Pre-offering market capitalization of issuing Means
firm [constant 2004US$ millions]
Medians
Obs.
Fraction of primary shares in total offering Means
[%]
Medians
Obs.
Underwriting syndicate structure: number
Means
of all managers
Medians
Obs.
Underwriting spread [%]
Means
Medians
Obs.
Underpricing: Price change from offer to
Means
first-day closing price [%]
Medians
Obs.
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Global SEOs

26.37
12.00
(26,015)
94.56
26.39
(30,945)
11.71
7.00
(13,632)
8,907
383
(14,073)
73.25
100.00
(31,066)
3.06
2.00
(31,222)
4.58
4.22
(17,152)
4.48
4.12
(17,152)

Non-AT

28.98
15.00
(21,798)
88.16
23.25
(25,847)
12.68
7.00
(11,029)
6,863
287
(11,443)
77.10
100.00
(25,993)
3.18
2.00
(26,113)
4.79
4.45
(13,738)
4.86
4.46
(13,738)

Pure AT

10.18
1.00
(3,179)
124.08
42.39
(3,952)
8.35
5.00
(1,806)
15,656
788
(1,829)
54.04
100.00
(3,926)
2.52
1.00
(3,958)
3.59
3.23
(2,531)
2.97
2.71
(2,531)

Mixed AT

21.07
0.00
(1,038)
137.19
55.93
(1,146)
5.90
4.00
(797)
22,696
1,057
(801)
51.62
100.00
(1,147)
2.13
1.00
(1,151)
4.21
3.91
(883)
2.98
2.74
(883)

Difference of Means
Non-AT
Non-AT
minus Pure
minus Mixed
18.79 a
[21.24]

7.91 a
[5.02]

-35.93 a
[-7.21]

-49.03 a
[-5.53]

4.33 a
[11.16]

6.78 a
[12.00]

-8,793 a
[-2.92]

-15,834 a
[-3.25]

23.06 a
[32.75]

25.49 a
[21.03]

0.66 a
[9.92]

1.05 a
[8.71]

1.20 a
[3.62]
1.89 a
[3.95]

0.58 a
[2.12]
1.88 a
[4.88]
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Table IV: Univariate Comparisons between Accelerated Transactions (AT) and Traditional (Non-AT) Underwritings, U.S. Seasoned
Equity Offerings, 1991-2004
This table shows the mean, the median values of the main variables of interest for the U.S. seasoned equity offerings, non-accelerated transactions,
pure and mixed accelerated transactions (AT) and their difference in means between non accelerated and pure AT, and non accelerated and mixed
AT. t-statistics are reported in brackets. a indicates significance at the 1%, b at the 5% level, respectively.
Measure

Time from launch date to issue date [days]

Issue proceeds
[constant 2004US$ millions]
Relative Issue Size [%]

Pre-offering market capitalization of
issuing firm
[constant 2004US$ millions]
Fraction of primary shares in total offering
[%]
Underwriting syndicate structure: number
of all managers
Underwriting spread [%]

Underpricing: Price change from offer to
first-day closing price [%]
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Non-AT
average
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.

48.67
31.00
(7,165)
108.51
58.86
(7,443)
10.50
7.00
(2,719)
5,248
931
(2,736)
76.34
100.00
(7,419)
4.75
3.00
(7,446)
2.53
2.32
(6,363)
2.54
2.30
(6,363)

Pure AT
average
9.82
0.00
(300)
145.16
70.46
(328)
6.50
5.00
(167)
8,170
1,984
(168)
62.31
100.00
(328)
1.98
1.00
(328)
3.10
2.82
(243)
1.76
1.60
(243)

Mixed AT
average
46.43
5.00
(423)
201.65
101.80
(496)
7.67
6.00
(267)
10,339
1,511
(267)
74.81
100.00
(496)
2.89
1.00
(496)
3.15
2.91
(461)
2.06
1.92
(461)

Difference of Means
Non-AT
Non-AT minus
minus Pure
Mixed
38.84 a
[11.17]

2.24 a
[0.73]

-36.65 a
[-3.51]

-93.14 a
[-10.33]

4.00 a
[4.46]

2.83 a
[3.99]

-2,922
[-1.36]

-5,090 b
[2.56]

14.03 a
[6.73]

1.53
[0.89]

2.77 a
[9.68]

1.85 a
[7.87]

-0.57
[-1.45]

-0.62 b
[-1.81]

0.78 b
[1.89]

0.48 b
[1.69]
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Table V: Univariate Comparisons between Accelerated Transactions (AT) and Traditional (Non-AT) Underwritings, European Seasoned
Equity Offerings, 1991-2004
This table shows the mean, the median values of the main variables of interest for the European seasoned equity offerings, non-accelerated
transactions, pure and mixed accelerated transactions (AT) and their difference in means between non accelerated and pure AT, and non
accelerated and mixed AT. t-statistics are reported in brackets. a indicates significance at the 1%, b at the 5% level, respectively.
Non-AT
average
Measure
Time from launch date to issue date [days]

Issue proceeds
[constant 2004US$ millions]
Relative Issue Size [%]

Pre-offering market capitalization of
issuing firm
[constant 2004US$ millions]
Fraction of primary shares in total offering
[%]
Underwriting syndicate structure: number
of all managers
Underwriting spread [%]

Underpricing: Price change from offer to
first-day closing price [%]
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Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.

15.92
6.00
(3,515)
122.04
19.92
(6,047)
13.56
7.00
(2,036)
2,707
110.47
(2,145)
68.05
100.00
(6,004)
2.58
1.00
(6,101)
7.07
6.45
(3,160)
7.32
6.55
(3,160)

Pure AT
average
5.12
0.00
(1,661)
144.67
39.87
(2,402)
8.43
4.00
(976)
21,874
769.68
(993)
38.69
0.00
(2,379)
1.53
1.00
(2,407)
3.46
3.12
(2,119)
2.97
2.67
(2,119)

Mixed AT
average
46.43
36.00
(7)
108.65
62.01
(37)
10.40
10.00
(20)
4,991
257.52
(20)
56.20
10.00
(37)
2.00
1.00
(38)
3.30
2.94
(35)
2.45
2.22
(35)

Difference of Means
Non-AT
Non-AT
minus Pure
minus Mixed
10.80 a
[11.56]

-30.51 b
[-2.34]

-22.64 b
[-2.29]

13.39
[0.18]

5.13 a
[8.35]

3.16
[0.84]

-19,167 a
[-4.16]

-2,284
[-0.49]

29.36 a
[25.96]

11.84
[1.56]

1.05 a
[14.09]

0.58
[0.99]

3.61 a
[4.44]

3.77 a
[4.62]

4.34 a
[4.98]

4.86 a
[5.36]
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Table VI: Univariate Comparisons between Accelerated Transactions (AT) and Traditional (Non-AT) Underwritings, Rest of the World
Seasoned Equity Offerings, 1991-2004
This table shows the mean, the median values of the main variables of interest for the seasoned equity offerings from the rest of the world outside
western Europe and the United States, non-accelerated transactions, pure and mixed accelerated transactions (AT) and their difference in means
between non accelerated and pure AT, and non accelerated and mixed AT. t-statistics are reported in brackets. a indicates significance at the 1%, b
at the 5% level, respectively.
Non-AT
average
Measure
Time from launch date to issue date [days]

Issue proceeds
[constant 2004US$ millions]
Relative Issue Size [%]

Pre-offering market capitalization of
issuing firm
[constant 2004US$ millions]
Fraction of primary shares in total offering
[%]
Underwriting syndicate structure: number
of all managers
Underwriting spread [%]

Underpricing: Price change from offer to
first-day closing price [%]
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Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.
Means
Medians
Obs.

20.42
3.00
(11,118)
59.32
10.46
(12,357)
13.37
7.00
(6,274)
8,894
192.61
(6,562)
81.88
100.00
(12,570)
2.54
1.00
(12,566)
6.48
5.77
(4,215)
6.51
6.02
(4,215)

Pure AT
average
17.18
19.00
(1,218)
77.95
39.36
(1,222)
8.70
7.00
(663)
8,295
655.04
(668)
81.78
100.00
(1,219)
4.62
4.00
(1,223)
5.99
5.55
(169)
4.63
4.21
(169)

Mixed AT
average
3.13
0.00
(608)
86.75
23.81
(613)
4.79
2.00
(510)
29,804
918.27
(514)
32.60
0.00
(614)
1.51
1.00
(617)
5.54
5.08
(387)
4.13
3.78
(387)

Difference of Means
Non-AT
Non-AT
minus Pure
minus Mixed
3.24 a
[2.75]

17.29 a
[10.41]

-18.63 b
[-2.52]

-27.43 a
[-2.61]

4.64 a
[6.93]

8.55 a
[11.24]

599
[0.11]

-20,910 a
[-2.62]

0.10
[0.08]

49.28 a
[31.37]

-2.08 a
[-21.75]

1.03 a
[7.91]

0.49
[1.55]

0.94 b
[1.72]

1.88 a
[2.22]

2.38 a
[2.77]
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Table VII: Regression Analysis of Underwriting Spread and Underpricing
This table reports the estimated coefficients of OLS regressions of underwriting spreads and underpricing.
Underwriting spread is given by the percentage difference between the stock’s offering price to the public
and the previous trading day’s closing price. Underpricing is the percentage change in value experienced
by investors who purchase shares at the offer price and hold these until the close of trading on the offer
day. AT is a dummy variable for any accelerated transaction (pure and mixed combined). Pure AT is a
dummy variable for an pure accelerated transaction. Mixed AT is a variable for a pure accelerated
transaction. ABO, BT, and BD are dummy variables for accelerated bookbuilt offers, block trades, and
bought deals respectively. U.S. and Europe are dummy variables for issues originated in the United
States, or in Europe, respectively. % Primary is the fraction of the offering representing primary (newlycreated) shares. Offer size is the natural log of gross offer proceeds, in $U.S. million. *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.

Intercept
AT
Pure AT
Mixed AT
ABO
BT
BD
U.S.
Europe
% Primary
Offer size
Adj R2
N

Dependent variables
Underwriting spread
0.0684***
0.0676***
0.0672***
0.0700***
(0.0027)
(0.0027)
(0.0026)
(0.0028)
-0.0176***
-0.0252***
(0.0023)
(0.0023)
-0.0253***
(0.0027)
-0.0019
-0.0012
(0.0038)
(0.0036)
-0.0279***
(0.0045)
-0.0185***
(0.0069)
-0.0155***
(0.0071)
-0.0370***
-0.0367***
-0.0360***
-0.0352***
(0.0021)
(0.0021)
(0.0020)
(0.0022)
-0.0017
0.0023
0.0009
0.0025
(0.0023)
(0.0024)
(0.0024)
(0.0023)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001***
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
-0.0014***
-0.0014***
-0.0013***
-0.0029***
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
(0.0005)
0.03
17,071

0.03
17,071
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0.03
17,071

0.03
17,071

Underpricing
0.0693***
0.0691***
(0.0028)
(0.0027)

-0.0316***
(0.0028)
-0.0122***
(0.0039)

-0.0350***
(0.0022)
0.0058***
(0.0025)
0.0001***
(0.0000)
-0.0029***
(0.0005)

-0.0139***
(0.0045)
-0.0299***
(0.0035)
-0.0166***
(0.0071)
-0.0142***
(0.0069)
-0.0349***
(0.0021)
0.0038
(0.0024)
0.0001***
(0.0000)
-0.0028***
(0.0005)

0.04
17,071

0.03
17,071
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Table VIII: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Verified Announcement Date for Global,
U.S., European, and Rest-of-World (ROW) Seasoned Equity Offerings, 1991-2004
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates of seasoned equity offerings
around the world and in various regional sub-samples, using announcement dates that have been verified
as the earliest mentions of seasoned equity offers through a manual search of Lexis/Nexis. Abnormal
returns were generated using market-model expected returns.
Sample or sub-sample
Panel A: All seasoned equity offerings
All accelerated (AT) SEOs
All non-accelerated (non-AT) SEOs
Difference (AT-non AT)
All pure secondary SEOs
All mixed primary/secondary SEOs
All pure primary SEOs
Difference (pure primary-pure secondary)
Panel B: U.S. seasoned equity offerings
U.S. accelerated (AT) SEOs
U.S. non-accelerated (non-AT) SEOs
Difference (AT-non AT)
U.S. pure secondary SEOs
U.S. mixed primary/secondary SEOs
U.S. pure primary SEOs
Difference (pure primary-pure secondary)
Panel C: European seasoned equity offerings
European accelerated (AT) SEOs
European non-accelerated (non-AT) SEOs
Difference (AT-non AT)
European pure secondary SEOs
European mixed primary/secondary SEOs
European pure primary SEOs
Difference (pure primary-pure secondary)
Panel D: Rest-of-world (ROW) seasoned equity offerings
ROW accelerated (AT) SEOs
ROW non-accelerated (non-AT) SEOs
Difference (AT-non AT)
ROW pure secondary SEOs
ROW mixed primary/secondary SEOs
ROW pure primary SEOs
Difference (pure primary-pure secondary)
a
b

Number of
observations

CAR (-1, +1),
mean %

CAR (-1, +1),
median %

1,924
326
1,598

-1.17 a
-1.22 a
-1.16 a
-0.06

-1.46
-1.33
-1.49

381
307
1,236

-2.23 a
-3.06 a
-0.38
1.85 a

-2.08
-2.61
-1.07

875
97
778

-2.89 a
-1.34
-3.08 a
-1.75

-2.28
-1.95
-2.30

133
266
476

-3.23 a
-3.51 a
-2.45 a
0.77

-3.36
-2.87
-1.81

307
107
200

-0.23
-0.79
+0.06
-0.85

-0.15
-1.03
-0.04

128
15
164

-1.27 a
-1.49
0.69
1.97

-0.85
-0.66
0.05

742
122
620

+0.47
-1.51 a
+0.86
-2.36 a

-0.87
-1.25
-0.78

120
26
596

-2.15 a
+0.63
+0.99
-3.13 a

-2.14
+1.36
-0.68

Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table IX: Regression Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns around SEO Announcement
Dates
This table reports the estimated coefficients from a regression in which the dependent variable is the
cumulative abnormal return surround the SEO announcement date (-1, +1) using the market model to
estimate abnormal returns. The sample includes 1,924 announcement dates verified on Lexis/Nexis.
Offer size is the natural log of gross offer proceeds. Pure AT and Mixed AT are dummy variables equal
to one for pure or mixed accelerated offers respectively. ABO, BT, and BD are dummy variables for
accelerated bookbuilt offers, block trades, and bought deals respectively. % primary is the fraction of the
offer presenting primary shares. U.S. and Europe are dummy variables equal to one for deals offered in
the U.S. or Europe respectively.

Intercept
Gross proceeds
Pure AT
Mixed AT
ABO
BT
BD
% primary
US
Europe
Adjusted R2

Coefficient
-0.007
-0.000
-0.014
0.011

t-stat
-0.84
-0.08
-1.21
0.69

0.016***
-0.030***
0.001

2.07
-3.83
0.13

0.011

Coefficient
-0.005
-0.000

t-stat
-0.72
-0.07

0.009
-0.16
-0.009
-0.007
0.015***
-0.029***
0.002

0.59
-1.31
-1.11
-0.89
2.21
-3.65
0.18

0.015

*** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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